DIFC Arbitration Reform: More Teeth for Awards, Urgent Relief and Weak-Defence Cases

On 11 June 2026, the DIFC Authority published Consultation Paper No 2 of 2026, proposing substantial amendments to the DIFC Arbitration Law No 1 of 2008. If enacted, the law would become the Arbitration and Mediation Law of 2026. The proposals are not merely technical. They represent a material upgrade to the DIFC’s arbitration framework, with a clear focus on procedural efficiency, stronger tribunal powers, faster enforcement, and more effective interim relief.¹

That matters commercially. Arbitration is often chosen for neutrality, confidentiality, and enforceability. But users also want something more practical: a procedure that can dispose of hopeless claims or defences early, protect assets before they disappear, and convert awards into recovery without months of tactical resistance. The proposed reforms should be understood in that light.

For commercial parties, the reforms respond to three recurring problems in arbitration:

1. 1. • weak claims or defences being kept alive until a full final hearing;
      • award debtors using set aside applications, procedural objections and enforcement technicalities to delay recovery; and
      • claimants struggling to obtain urgent interim relief before assets move or evidence disappears.

1. Summary Disposal: A Tool to Stop Hopeless Claims and Defences

Perhaps the most important proposed reform for day to day commercial arbitration is Article 24D, which would allow an arbitral tribunal to make an award on a summary basis where a party has no real prospect of succeeding on a claim, defence or issue.²

This is significant because one of arbitration’s practical weaknesses is the absence, or perceived absence, of an equivalent to summary judgment. In court proceedings, a claimant faced with a plainly artificial defence may apply for summary judgment. In arbitration, even where a tribunal arguably has broad procedural powers, arbitrators may be reluctant to dispose of issues early because of concern that the losing party will later allege that it was denied due process. In this regard, arbitrators are often caught between competing pressures. On the one hand, arbitrators are faced with the need for efficient and cost effective resolution of the dispute, and, on the other, they may fear that any refusal to submit to parties’ procedural demands will open the award to challenge on the basis of violation of due process rights.³

The proposed Article 24D is designed to address that problem. It gives the tribunal an express statutory basis to say that a point does not need to go to a full evidentiary hearing. That is particularly valuable in straightforward debt claims, payment disputes, settlement agreement claims, simple termination disputes, or cases where the documentary record is clear and the defence is essentially tactical.

The reform also aligns with the approach taken in the English Arbitration Act 2025. During the English reform process, practitioners emphasised that express summary disposal would give tribunals greater confidence to deal with unmeritorious claims and defences without fear of later challenge.⁴ The same logic applies with equal, if not greater, force in the DIFC, where arbitration is often used in fast moving regional commercial disputes and enforcement risk is front of mind.

This is not to say that every weak looking case can be disposed of summarily. A tribunal will still need to give each party a reasonable opportunity to make representations. Article 24D is not a licence for rough justice. But it is a practical recognition that fairness does not require every bad defence to be carried all the way to a final hearing.

The point is reinforced by the proposed amendment to Article 25, replacing the current “full opportunity” language with a “reasonable opportunity” to present the case. That change is directed at the well known problem of “due process paranoia”: the tendency of tribunals to over accommodate weak procedural objections because of concern that the award may later be attacked.⁵ The proposed wording should give tribunals greater confidence to manage cases firmly while preserving basic procedural fairness.

2. Stronger Enforcement: Less Room for Tactical Award Challenges

The second major practical theme is enforcement. The proposed Article 41(3) would reduce the period for seeking to set aside a DIFC seated award from three months to 30 days.⁶

That is a bold pro enforcement change. It reflects a simple proposition: if arbitration is to be final and effective, an award debtor should not be able to hold an award hostage for months while it considers whether to bring an unmeritorious challenge. Award challenges have a legitimate role, but they should not become a second arbitration by another route.

Recent DIFC case law already shows a disciplined approach to set aside applications and enforcement objections. In Okeke v Obike, the DIFC Court dismissed a set aside application as out of time under Article 41(3), holding that the statutory time limit was mandatory and that an application filed after expiry was inadmissible.⁷ The Court also made clear that an “unable to present case” objection is not a broad appeal against the tribunal’s assessment of evidence. It concerns fundamental practical unfairness, not disagreement with a tribunal’s reasoning.⁸

Similarly, in Obert and Ona v Ondray, the Court recognised a DIFC seated award and rejected objections based on jurisdiction, procedural fairness and public policy. The Court emphasised separability and held that the arbitration clause survived independently of the underlying contractual arrangements; the respondent could not recast ordinary merits and procedural complaints as Article 41 grounds.⁹

The same pro enforcement discipline appears in Ozan v Owain. There, the Court explained that DIFC recognition and enforcement under Article 42 and RDC Part 43 operates through a two stage framework: the Court may recognise and enforce the award on a prima facie basis, and the respondent then has a defined opportunity to challenge the order.¹⁰ That structure reflects the policy of efficient enforcement, balanced against the limited grounds for refusal under Article 44.¹¹

The proposed reforms build on that approach. A shorter set aside period should make it harder for award debtors to delay enforcement through late, technical or tactical challenges. It will also force parties to evaluate any genuine challenge promptly.

The practical problem is illustrated by Oratio v Orangia (Rodrigo Carè appeared for the award creditor in these proceedings, instructed by the Galadari team). There, the award creditor sought security for the full award sum of AED 14,043,096.42 pending determination of consolidated set aside and recognition/enforcement proceedings.¹² The Court noted that Article 44(2) confers a discretionary power to order security where the Court adjourns its decision on recognition or enforcement.¹³ However, the Court held that the statutory gateway in Article 44(2) was not engaged because consolidation of the set aside and recognition/enforcement proceedings was a case management step, not an adjournment of the Court’s decision on recognition or enforcement within the meaning of that provision.¹⁴ The Court therefore dismissed the application.¹⁵

Oratio is useful because it shows that even a successful award creditor may still face technical enforcement friction. If the recognition/enforcement application is effectively delayed while a set aside application is determined, the award creditor may suffer real prejudice; but the statutory mechanics for obtaining security may not be available unless the precise Article 44(2) gateway is met. That is exactly the type of issue which a modernised arbitration statute should address clearly.

There is, however, a point of calibration. A 30 day deadline is commercially attractive for award creditors, but in large, multilingual or multi party arbitrations it may be demanding. Parties may need to analyse a lengthy award, take instructions across jurisdictions, consider Article 41 grounds, and prepare evidence. A limited power to extend time in exceptional cases may therefore be worth considering. But the policy direction is right: DIFC seated awards should move more quickly from award to enforcement.

3. Interim and Freezing Relief: Making Arbitration Useful Before the Award

The third major theme is urgent relief. For claimants, arbitration is only useful if it can preserve the position before the final award. A claimant who waits 18 months for an award may win on paper but lose in practice if assets have been dissipated, control of a company has shifted, bank mandates have changed, or documents have disappeared.

The proposed reforms therefore strengthen the DIFC’s interim relief architecture. Proposed Article 15 would clarify the DIFC Court’s power to grant interim measures in support of arbitration proceedings, irrespective of whether the seat is in the DIFC. Proposed Articles 24, 24F and 24G would further enhance the powers of arbitral tribunals to grant and enforce interim measures, issue peremptory orders and emergency arbitrator relief.¹⁶

The importance of these powers is clear from recent DIFC cases.

In Oswin v Otila and Ondray, the DIFC Court continued an interim injunction in support of a DIFC seated arbitration arising under a joint venture agreement. The Injunction was granted to preserve the status quo pending determination of the dispute in circumstances of a deadlock over the management and operation of the joint venture company, and restrained unilateral actions affecting the management.¹⁷ The judgment is also significant because the Court held that, absent clear contrary indicia, the law of the DIFC seat governed the arbitration agreement.¹⁸ That is precisely the type of satellite dispute that the proposed Article 12A seeks to avoid by codifying a seat based rule for the law of the arbitration agreement.

In Orabelle v Orzenia, by contrast, the DIFC Court refused an urgent ex parte worldwide freezing order in support of a future Paris seated arbitration. The applicant was unable to identify any assets in the DIFC, and the Court held that it had not established a sufficient jurisdictional basis under Article 15(4), being unconvinced that the requirement for “suitable precautionary measures within the DIFC” was satisfied where the relief sought was directed at assets outside the DIFC and no DIFC nexus had been identified.¹⁹ The case illustrates the uncertainty that can arise where relief is sought in support of foreign seated or not yet commenced arbitration.

The issue remains live. In Olympio v Olwin, the DIFC Court of Appeal granted permission to appeal in proceedings concerning a worldwide freezing order and accepted that there was a cogent argument, supported by prior Court of Appeal authority, that the DIFC Courts possess freestanding jurisdiction to grant interim measures, in aid of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards or judgments.²⁰

These cases show why Article 15 matters. The DIFC should be able to support arbitration effectively where urgent relief is necessary to preserve assets or the enforceability of an award. At the same time, the jurisdictional gateway should be clear, so that urgent applications are not consumed by threshold disputes about whether the Court has power to act.

The related decision in Ovya v Oshie is also important. The Court criticised the applicant’s failure to draw the earlier decision in Orabelle to the Court’s attention on an ex parte application and reaffirmed the strict duty of full and frank disclosure, emphasizing that it is for the Court, not the applicant, to determine what material is relevant.²¹ That is a useful reminder that stronger urgent relief powers must be matched by proper safeguards. Freezing orders and without notice relief are powerful tools. They are essential in fraud and asset recovery cases, but they depend on candour from the applicant.

4. Peremptory Orders, Security for Costs and Emergency Arbitrators

The proposed reforms would also make tribunals more effective once the arbitration is underway.

Article 24A would expressly empower arbitral tribunals to order security for costs. That is important where a claimant may be impecunious, funded, or unable to meet an adverse costs award. Article 24F would introduce peremptory orders, enabling tribunals to respond more effectively to non compliance with their orders or directions. Article 24G would reinforce the effectiveness of emergency arbitrator relief by allowing an emergency arbitrator to make a peremptory order if a party fails to comply without sufficient cause.²²

These powers matter because tactical non compliance is a recurring problem in arbitration. A party may ignore procedural orders, delay document production, refuse to pay advances, or use procedural default to create grounds for later challenge. The proposed provisions give tribunals a stronger statutory answer.

This is not merely about efficiency. It is about making arbitration a real recovery mechanism. If a claimant must arbitrate but cannot obtain interim relief, security, adverse inferences or meaningful enforcement of procedural orders, then arbitration risks becoming weaker than court litigation. The proposed law seeks to close that gap.

5. Partial and Provisional Awards: Earlier Recovery Where Appropriate

The proposed reforms would also clarify the status of partial and provisional awards.

Proposed Article 24E would empower arbitral tribunals to make provisional awards. Proposed Article 37B would expressly permit tribunals to issue awards on different issues or parts of claims at different stages of the proceedings. The definition of “Award” would also be expanded to include interim, partial, summary and provisional awards.²³

That is commercially useful. In many arbitrations, liability may be clear while quantum remains disputed. A discrete issue may determine most of the case. Or a claimant may be entitled to interim payment or security before the final award.

Nalani v Netty illustrates the value of statutory clarity. The DIFC Court held that a partial award containing operative and final relief could be recognised and enforced, even though the arbitration as a whole had not concluded.²⁴ The proposed reforms would place that logic more clearly on the face of the statute, reducing arguments about whether an award is sufficiently final for recognition or enforcement.

 

Conclusion

The proposed DIFC Arbitration and Mediation Law is best understood as a practical reform package. It is not only about modernising legislative language. It is about making arbitration more effective for commercial users.

If enacted substantially in its current form, the law should help parties:

1. 1. • dispose of hopeless claims and defences earlier;
      • obtain urgent interim and freezing relief where recovery is at risk;
      • use emergency arbitrators and peremptory orders more effectively;
      • secure costs in appropriate cases;
      • enforce partial, provisional and summary awards with greater confidence;
      • obtain security, where appropriate, when award enforcement is delayed by set aside proceedings; and
      • move more quickly from final award to enforcement.

The reforms should therefore make the DIFC a stronger arbitral seat. The challenge is calibration. The final law should empower tribunals and support enforcement, without creating new satellite disputes about jurisdiction, due process, security gateways or the limits of interim relief.

For arbitration users, the direction of travel is clear: DIFC arbitration is likely to become more robust, more enforcement focused, and better equipped to deal with weak defences, tactical delay and urgent asset protection issues.

 

Footnotes

1. 1. 1. DIFC Authority, Consultation Paper No 2 of 2026: Proposed Amendment of DIFC Arbitration Law (11 June 2026) paras 12 to 16. ↩
      2. Draft DIFC Arbitration and Mediation Law 2026, proposed art 24D. ↩
      3. Erika Williams, Hannah Fas and Tom Hannah, ‘Due Process Paranoia and its Role in the Future of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2018) The Arbitrator and Mediator, available at williamsarbitration.com. ↩
      4. See eg Allen and Overy LLP, Written Evidence to the Arbitration Bill Special Public Bill Committee (6 February 2024) paras 11 to 12; Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, Written Evidence to the Arbitration Bill Special Public Bill Committee (6 February 2024) paras 2.2 to 2.6. ↩
      5. Annexure B to DIFC Authority, Consultation Paper No 2 of 2026: Proposed Amendments to the Arbitration Law (11 June 2026), comments on proposed art 25. ↩
      6. Draft DIFC Arbitration and Mediation Law 2026, proposed art 41(3). ↩
      7. Okeke v Obike [2025] DIFC ARB 039 (DIFC CFI, 5 March 2026) [39] to [40]. ↩
      8. ibid [47] to [52]. ↩
      9. Obert and Ona v Ondray [2025] DIFC ARB 014 (DIFC CFI, 9 October 2025) [23] to [33]. ↩
      10. Ozan v Owain [2025] DIFC ARB 029 (DIFC CFI, 9 April 2026) [65] to [71]. ↩
      11. ibid [70] to [71]. ↩
      12. Oratio v Orangia [2025] DIFC ARB 043 (DIFC CFI, 13 February 2026) [1] to [2]. ↩
      13. ibid [35] to [37]. ↩
      14. ibid [38] to [44]. ↩
      15. ibid [45] to [47]. ↩
      16. Draft DIFC Arbitration and Mediation Law 2026, proposed arts 15, 24, 24F and 24G. ↩
      17. Oswin v Otila and Ondray [2025] DIFC ARB 032 (DIFC CFI, 16 September 2025) [1] to [8]. ↩
      18. ibid [11]. ↩
      19. Orabelle v Orzenia [2026] DIFC ARB 007 (DIFC CFI, 30 January 2026) [23] to [32]. ↩
      20. Olympio v Olwin [2025] DIFC ARB 024 (DIFC CA, 24 March 2026) [55] to [62]. ↩
      21. Ovya v Oshie [2026] DIFC ARB 023 (DIFC CFI, 24 April 2026) [145] to [162], citing Tugushev v Orlov [2019] EWHC 2031 (Comm). ↩
      22. Draft DIFC Arbitration and Mediation Law 2026, proposed arts 24A, 24F and 24G. ↩
      23. ibid proposed arts 24E and 37B, sch 1 definition of “Award.” ↩
      24. Nalani v Netty [2024] DIFC ARB 027 (DIFC CFI, 22 September 2025) [17] to [18]. ↩

 

	Sergejs Dilevka Partner sergejs@galadarilaw.com
	Rodrigo Carè Senior Counsel rodrigo.care@galadarilaw.com
	Mohamed El Mahdy Senior Associate m.elmahdy@galadarilaw.com
	Laureen Fredah Associate laureen.fredah@galadarilaw.com
	Chloé Heydarian Junior Associate chloe.heydarian@galadarilaw.com