Criminal Attribution in the Offence of Money Laundering under UAE Law
Criminal attribution and Its ImplicationS in money laundering offences
The difficulty of proving money laundering does not lie in establishing whether a financial transfer or transaction has taken place, as such facts can often be verified through bank statements, corporate records, and electronic platform data. The primary challenge arises at the subsequent stage: determining when a monetary movement crosses the line into a criminal act, and when that act can be properly attributed to a specific individual.
This is where the principle of attribution comes into play. Attribution is neither an additional item of evidence to be added to the list of evidence nor a new element of the crime invented by legal scholarship alongside the established elements of the offence. Rather, it is the process through which the court moves from establishing the facts and legal elements to concluding that the constituent elements of the offence are attributable to a specific accused person.
This understanding is consistent with the established principles of criminal jurisprudence and legal scholarship, which have addressed attribution in the context of criminal procedural law as the act of linking conduct to an accused person on a legal, factual, and logical basis. A crime may be established in itself without the criminal liability of any particular person being established. Similarly, an accused person may be connected to the money, the account, or the company concerned, yet that connection alone may be insufficient to attribute money laundering to that person.
Between these two matters lies an entire evidentiary process concerning the conduct undertaken by the suspect, the extent of their control over the money, what they knew at the time of the transaction, and the purpose behind their actions where the applicable statutory provision requires a specific purpose.
This distinction becomes particularly important because money, unlike many other things, does not inherently reveal its origin. The same money may represent the proceeds of legitimate activity or the proceeds of crime. A gold bar, a bank balance, or a virtual asset bears no visible mark indicating its history. Accordingly, it is not sufficient to establish that money passed through an accused person’s account or was converted into gold or cryptocurrency. It is first necessary to establish what gave the money its unlawful description and, subsequently, what connects the accused person to that unlawful description.
This framework is reflected in Article 2 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, under which the legislator linked the offence of money laundering to the person’s knowledge—or the existence of sufficient evidence or indications establishing such knowledge—that all or part of the funds constitute proceeds of a predicate offence, followed by the intentional commission of one of the forms of conduct specified in the provision. This wording demonstrates that the legislator did not criminalise the mere movement of money. Rather, the provision links that movement to the nature of the funds, the offender’s state of mind, and the conduct in which they engaged.
Accordingly, attribution in money laundering remains a sequential process comprising a prior criminal activity that generates proceeds, an act involving those proceeds, a person to whom control over or participation in that act can be attributed, knowledge of the unlawful origin, and a specific intent required under the relevant statutory form of the offence. The evidence may be strong in relation to one link in this chain and weak in relation to another.
It must be emphasised that numerous transfers may establish the track of money, but they do not, in themselves, establish its origin. Likewise, establishing the unlawful origin of the funds does not automatically establish that everyone who dealt with it knew of that origin. The value of the attribution approach lies precisely in preventing these distinct links from being collapsed into a general impression of the transaction’s suspicious nature or its complexity.
The burden of proving attribution in the crime of money laundering
In money laundering cases, the burden of proof extends beyond demonstrating that funds were moved or that a transaction appeared unusual. The prosecution must establish that the funds are proceeds of crime, identify the specific conduct involving those funds, connect that conduct to the accused, and prove the requisite knowledge and intent as mandated by applicable statutory provisions.
Accordingly, the burden of proving attribution is not a separate burden independent of proving the crime. Rather, it represents the personal dimension of that proof, answering the question: why should the crime be attributed to this accused person rather than someone else?
This principle is not limited to money laundering offences. Article (28) of the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates establishes the principles that penalty is personal and the presumption of innocence. In alignment with these constitutional guarantees, the Criminal Code provides that an individual cannot be held criminally liable for an offense committed by another.
These principles are reflected in the rules of evidence, which require the prosecution to establish a sufficient evidential basis for a conviction. An accused person’s inability to explain a particular fact should not, by itself, be treated as direct evidence that an element of the offence has been established when the prosecution has failed to prove that element in the first place.
One point that commonly causes confusion concerns Article 2/3 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, which provides that Conviction of the Predicate Offence shall not be required to establish the illegitimate source of the Proceeds, nor shall it be required to prove knowledge of the specific type or nature of the predicate offence from which the proceeds were derived. Although this provision relaxes the evidentiary requirements in an important respect, it does not, however, eliminate the subject matter of proof itself. The legislator did not provide that the unlawful origin of the funds is to be presumed but established that proving such origin does not depend on the existence of a prior judgment in respect of the predicate offence.
This means that the legislator continues to require proof of the underlying facts that form subject matter of the conviction which is to be proved.
Consequently, funds of unverified origin must not be equated with funds of criminal origin. There may be wealth disproportionate to declared income, financial flows for which no clear explanation is apparent, or multiple accounts involving rapid movements of funds. All these circumstances may justify scrutiny and investigation and may ultimately form part of a stronger body of circumstantial evidence. However, they do not, on their own, alter the legal description of the funds. What is required is the presence of facts that enable the court to infer that the money originated from criminal activity, rather than merely establishing that its owner failed to provide the investigating authority with a satisfactory explanation of its source.
The same principle applies where proof is based on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is a means of proving a fact, not a means of shifting the burden of proving that fact. If the prosecution relies on the method of transfer, concealment of the beneficial owner, inconsistencies in the information provided, or the timing of transactions, the value of these facts is measured by their ability to prove the element they are intended to establish.
Inconsistencies in the accused person’s statements or the lack of credibility of their explanation may affect the assessment of the evidence already available. However, there is a distinction between a weak narration given by the accused that leads to strengthen an evidentiary case that already exists against him and using that narration as a substitute for an element that the prosecution has failed to prove in the first place.
Accordingly, the defence is more effective when it identifies the specific element that the prosecution was required to prove but failed to establish, rather than relying solely on a general denial. This means focusing on whether the prosecution has established the unlawful origin of the funds; whether the funds involved in the alleged conduct are the same funds connected to that origin; whether the accused performed the act in question or was acting under another party’s control, and whether the evidence on record establishes that the accused possessed the requisite knowledge from the outset. This approach ensures that each element is given its proper place in the framework of a criminal conviction.
Independence of the crime of money laundering from the predicate offence, and the limits of proving the unlawful origin of proceeds
The independence of the crime of money laundering from the predicate offense does not mean that the proceeds become devoid of a traceable or provable origin. Rather, independence means that the crime of money laundering possesses a distinct legal entity, such that prosecution for it does not depend on a prior conviction for the offense that generated the proceeds. However, from an evidentiary standpoint, the status of the funds as proceeds arises only from their connection to a prior criminal activity.
This meaning is clear from the definitions set out in Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025. A predicate offence is any act constituting a felony or misdemeanour, in accordance with the applicable legislation of the State. Proceeds are funds derived, directly or indirectly, from the commission of any felony or misdemeanour, including profits, privileges, and any equivalent assets that have been converted, in whole or in part, into other funds.
Accordingly, the classification of funds as proceeds depends less on their form than on their origin. Cash may be converted into gold, deposited into a bank account, and subsequently transferred into virtual assets without forfeiting its status as proceeds, provided that the continuity of value derived from the underlying offense remains established across each stage.
It is useful here to draw on the logic of causation, not because the link between the source of funds and money laundering constitutes causation in the technical sense applicable to result-based offences, but rather to draw on the underlying principle that the mere occurrence of two successive events is insufficient, in itself, to attribute one to the other. Similarly, a result cannot be attributed to an act merely because it occurred afterwards. Money cannot be attributed to an offence simply because it appeared after the offence was committed or was in the possession of a person accused of that offence. There must be a link that permits the conclusion that the money was generated by that criminal activity.
This link may be described as the connection between the proceeds and their criminal source. It is not an additional element beyond those prescribed by law. If the Public Prosecution stated that a particular sum of money or asset constitutes proceeds, the natural question is: what facts connect those funds to the criminal activity? The answer may be a direct transfer from a victim’s account, a correspondence in the amount and timing, a documented chain of financial transactions, sham invoices, companies with no genuine business activity, or a combination of mutually reinforcing circumstantial evidence leading to the same conclusion.
This issue becomes particularly sensitive when legitimate and illegitimate funds are commingled or when the form of the funds changes repeatedly. The law permits the tracing of value even after conversion, but it does not exempt the investigation from the obligation to establish the path that value followed. If the proceeds of fraud are used to purchase gold bars, which are then sold and the proceeds deposited into a company’s account, with part of the balance subsequently used to purchase a virtual asset, the question remains how much of the value is connected to the original source and how that value could be traced. Although the broad statutory definition of proceeds facilitates the treatment of converted assets, it does not turn the tracing process into a presumption that the funds originated from unlawful activity.
Money laundering cases involving gold provide a clear practical illustration of this point. The risk does not arise from purchasing or selling gold in itself, as such activity is legitimate. It arises from the circumstances that may reveal the source of the funds and the role of gold in transferring value or concealing its trail. In certain cases examined by the Financial Action Task Force “FATF”, the evidence began with proceeds linked to criminal activity and then traced the cash through gold purchases, companies, invoices, and subsequent sales. Accordingly, the offence was not inferred from the mere presence of gold, but from the link connecting the criminal proceeds to the gold and then to the subsequent transactions.
On this basis, the appropriate defence argument in this type of case is not merely that no conviction has been obtained for the predicate offence, since the legislator has expressly addressed that point. Instead, the focus should be on whether the evidence on record establishes in the first place that the funds, subject to the charge, originated from a criminal activity. The autonomous nature of the money laundering offense separates the proof of the proceeds’ origin from the need for a prior conviction that identifies the perpetrator or specifies the precise legal classification of the predicate offense.
Attribution of knowledge and intent in the crime of money laundering and the limits of inferring them from circumstantial evidence
At the outset, it must be emphasised that establishing that funds constitute proceeds of crime does not mean that everyone who dealt with those funds knew that fact. Although this point may appear self-evident, it is one of the most common sources of confusion in complex cases. The objective fact concerning the nature of the funds may be established, while the mental state—namely, the intent—of each accused person still requires separate proof. A person may have received, transferred, or used the funds at a time when they did not possess the information necessary to reveal their true origin.
A review of Article 2 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 shows that the provision is founded on the requirement of knowledge, while also providing that such knowledge may be established through sufficient evidence or circumstantial indications. It further provides that knowledge may be inferred from the factual and objective circumstances attendant upon its commission.
The legislator’s approach establishes a practical method of proof, given that knowledge is an internal mental state and is rarely established through an express admission. However, it should be noted that, in my assessment, this wording does not mean that mere negligence or the fact that a person ought to have known is sufficient in itself. The evidence and circumstantial indications referred to in the provision are directed towards establishing actual knowledge, rather than replacing that requirement with a presumed duty to investigate.
According to criminal law scholarship, the general theory of criminal intent, particularly the relationship between knowledge and will, establishes that criminal intent is directed towards conduct on the basis of the offender’s understanding of the surrounding facts. Accordingly, in money laundering offences, the subject of knowledge is not the name of the predicate offence or its precise legal classification, as the law does not require this. Rather, it is the criminal nature of the proceeds. An accused person may not know whether the funds originated from fraud, drug trafficking, or embezzlement, yet attribution may still be established if they knew that the funds originated from criminal activity.
Care must therefore be taken when relying on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge. For example, the mere existence of a large financial transaction, dealings with a high-risk client, rapid transfers, or the use of virtual assets, may warrant enhanced scrutiny, however, none of these circumstances is sufficient, on its own, to establish that the accused knew the funds were proceeds of a predicate offence.
The inference becomes stronger when these circumstances are accompanied by evidence demonstrating that the relevant information actually reached the accused person. Such evidence may include correspondence, instructions, or deliberately false information provided directly or indirectly by the accused. It may also include attempts to conceal the beneficial owner, the deliberate splitting of transactions following a specific warning, or a direct relationship with someone known to be aware of the source of the funds.
Time is equally important in establishing attribution. A person may receive funds at a time when the transaction appears ordinary and only subsequently learn that the funds originated from criminal activity. Such subsequent knowledge does not automatically relate back to the time of receipt. However, it becomes relevant to the person’s subsequent conduct. Accordingly, proof of knowledge must be linked to the specific act charged and the date on which it occurred, rather than merely to the fact that the accused became aware of the true nature of the funds at some point.
A further distinction must be drawn between knowledge and specific intent in cases involving the conversion or transfer of proceeds, or the conduct of transactions involving them. Article 2/1-a of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 requires the specific intent to conceal or disguise the unlawful origin of the proceeds. An accused person may engage in conduct that raises suspicion, such as distributing funds among linked accounts, using fabricated descriptions, establishing companies without any genuine economic function, or consolidating value in the hands of the beneficial owner. However, despite the foregoing, intent remains an element that cannot be presumed merely from the occurrence of the transfer or the suspicious transaction itself, even though assessing its existence or absence remains within the judge’s discretion based on weighing the evidence and determining its significance.
Here, the defense must not rely on a mere general assertion of ‘lack of knowledge.’ Instead, it must examine each piece of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution individually, clarifying its true significance to demonstrate whether it was known to the accused and, if so, at what specific time. Furthermore, the defense should distinguish whether the transaction was merely unusual or crossed the threshold into illegal activity and demonstrate whether the foregoing indicates actual knowledge of illegality or merely constitutes recklessness and/or negligence.
The temporal application of money laundering legislation and its effect on criminal attribution
An examination of criminal attribution is not complete merely by identifying the conduct attributed to the accused and establishing what they knew at the time it occurred. An equally important preliminary question must first be addressed: when did the conduct actually take place, and which law governed it at that time?
Attribution concerns a specific act committed by a particular person at a particular time. Determining when the conduct occurred therefore forms part of identifying the applicable legal framework, particularly in financial cases in which the movement of funds may extend over months or years and involve the receipt, possession, transfer, reinvestment, or movement of funds between different accounts and assets.
The importance of this issue becomes more apparent following the issuance of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025, which entered into force on 14 October 2025, replacing Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018. Where a financial case involves transactions that began under the previous law and continued after the new law entered into force, the fact that all the transactions concern the same funds or the same individuals does not necessarily permit them to be treated collectively under a single legislative framework.
The general rule under the Criminal Code is that an offence is governed by the law in force at the time it was committed. The relevant consideration in determining that time is when the acts constituting the offence occurred, rather than when their consequences became apparent. This principle is complemented by Article 14, concerning the law more favourable to the accused, and Article 16, concerning continuing offences, successive offences, and habitual offences whose commission continues under the new law.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the movement of money extending over time and the legal continuation of an offence. The same funds may pass through several accounts or be subject to successive transfers without necessarily constituting a single continuing or successive offence. A transfer made on a particular date may constitute a completed act on its own, followed by a new transaction with its own elements, timing, and independent significance. Accordingly, the mere financial connection between successive transactions must not give rise to an assumption that they constitute one extended criminal offence governed in its entirety by the latest legislation enacted during that period.
This distinction becomes clear in practice where funds enter a person’s account before Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 enters into force, and the person subsequently transfers the funds, conceals their nature, or undertakes a new transaction involving them after that date. The initial act is not governed by the new law simply because the funds remained in the account after the law entered into force. Instead, the legal nature of each act must be determined separately.
On the other hand, if the facts and their legal classification establish a continuing or successive offence whose commission continued after the new law entered into force, Article 16 may permit the application of the new law to that conduct. Reaching this conclusion, however, requires a legal classification of the conduct; it cannot be based merely on the fact that the account remained open or that the funds continued to move.
From this perspective, the multiple transfers alone do not answer the question of which law applies, given that the number of transactions does not reveal the legal nature of the conduct. Ten transfers may, in reality, constitute ten independent acts, while in other circumstances they may be connected to a single criminal scheme satisfying the requirements for successive offending. The key consideration is not the external appearance of the financial activity, but rather the intrinsic relationship between the acts in terms of their nature, timing, and underlying intent. This distinction has a direct effect on criminal attribution because it prevents an earlier act from being attributed to the accused on the basis of criminalisation requirements or mental elements introduced by a subsequent provision that was not in force when the act occurred.
The date of the predicate offence does not resolve this issue. The offence that generated the proceeds may have occurred under one law, while the money laundering conduct may have taken place later and been governed by another. This is a natural consequence of the legal independence of the two offences.
For example, if fraud occurred in 2024, but the accused did not deal with the proceeds until transferring or concealing them after 14 October 2025—the date on which the new law entered into force—the law applicable to the money laundering conduct is determined primarily by the date of that conduct itself, rather than by the date of the fraud that generated the funds. Conversely, the mere fact that the predicate offense occurred prior to the entry into force of the new law does not render an act of money laundering—which was likewise completed before that date—subject to newly introduced provisions simply because the investigation continued or the offense was discovered thereafter.
This issue becomes even more important when examining knowledge and intent because timing operates in two interrelated ways. First, it determines which law was in force when the act occurred. Second, it determines the accused person’s mental state at that same moment. It is therefore impermissible to take knowledge acquired later and retrospectively attribute it to an earlier act, just as it is impermissible to apply a new criminal law retroactively to conduct completed before the law took effect.
In practice, a case that spans across the date a new law took effect should not be treated as one long bank statement. Instead, it must be broken down step by step: look at each act, its date, its nature, the law active at that time, and what the accused actually knew at that exact moment. This analysis frequently shows where the prosecution wrongly grouped separate acts into a single charge or treated a lasting financial effect as an ongoing offense when the execution was already complete.
Accordingly, the temporal application of the law is no mere secondary issue limited to sentencing; it goes directly to the lawfulness of the criminal charge itself. The inquiry must go beyond establishing whether money laundering occurred. It must determine precisely which act took place, when it occurred, which statutory provision governed it at that specific moment, and what the accused actually knew at that exact time. Criminal liability can only be established under the law in force when the act was committed, fully respecting the principle of the more favorable law as an indispensable safeguard. Time is therefore not merely a date attached to an incident; it is an essential factor in defining the limits of what may and may not lawfully be attributed to the accused.
The boundary between banking suspicion and criminal proof
A significant proportion of money laundering cases start outside the investigation room, within the compliance systems of banks and financial institutions. A monitoring system may detect a change in an account’s transaction pattern, transfers inconsistent with a customer’s business activities, multiple senders with no apparent relationship to one another, or funds being rapidly transferred to another destination. At this stage, the bank is not seeking to prove a crime; rather, it is determining whether reasonable grounds exist to justify examining and reporting the transaction.
Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 explicitly distinguishes between these two stages. In defining a ‘suspicious transaction,’ the statute targets transactions involving funds where reasonable grounds exist to suspect they derive from a felony or misdemeanour or relate to money laundering or associated offenses. Suspicion thus carries its own distinct legal function as a preventive measure—triggered well before the funds are judicially proven to be criminal proceeds. Indeed, any reporting regime would be rendered futile if financial institutions were required to establish the underlying offense before filing a report.
The regulatory framework established by the Central Bank of the UAE reflects this exact logic. The standard for reporting is strictly ‘reasonable grounds to suspect,’ evaluated against transaction patterns, customer information, customer due diligence, and other indicators. An institution need not await a judgment establishing the predicate crime—nor assemble a full evidentiary case proving criminal origin—before determining that a transaction must be reported.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations similarly delineate these operational phases. Recommendation 20 establishes the obligation to report suspicious transactions; Recommendation 29 governs the mandate of Financial Intelligence Units to receive, analyze, and disseminate operational intelligence; and Recommendation 30 defines the investigative responsibilities of law enforcement authorities. Collectively, these Standards reinforce the strict institutional separation between the reporting, intelligence analysis, and criminal investigation stages. A suspicion report and the analysis resulting from it do not, by themselves, establish the elements of the offence or the liability of any particular person.
The problem arises when the standard applicable at the initial stage is carried over to the final stage without any changes. A Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) —a report submitted by an obligated institution, such as a bank, exchange house, or other regulated entity, to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) when reasonable grounds for suspicion exist—may provide an excellent basis for initiating an investigation. However, it is not a judicial finding that the funds constitute proceeds of crime or that the account holder knew of their origin.
Its real evidentiary value lies in what the subsequent investigation may uncover, such as identifiable victims, other accounts, correspondence, beneficial owners, or a financial trail connecting the proceeds to the predicate offence.
For example, if an account ordinarily receiving a modest salary begins receiving large sums from several individuals and rapidly transferring those sums abroad, this may be sufficient to raise suspicion and trigger a report. However, it does not, by itself, establish money laundering. Criminal proof requires the source of the funds to be established, the account holder’s role to be identified, and their knowledge of the unlawful origin to be demonstrated.
The same principle applies to gold and cryptocurrencies. Rapid purchases and sales of gold, or the movement of virtual assets between multiple wallets, may constitute risk indicators. Nevertheless, these circumstances are not sufficient, in themselves, to support a conviction without proof of the source of the funds, control over them, and knowledge of their true nature.
Ultimately, suspicion justifies an inquiry, but conviction requires the prosecution to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Limits of circumstantial evidence and its corroboration in establishing attribution
Effective efforts to combat money laundering cannot reasonably require direct evidence of every element of the offence. By its very nature, money laundering often involves multiple intermediaries, shell entities, complex account structures, and successive transactions, rendering circumstantial evidence indispensable. However, the admissibility or relevance of circumstantial evidence does not mean that the mere accumulation of disconnected facts necessarily establishes judicial certainty. The critical inquiry is what each fact actually establishes and how it contributes, when assessed in its proper context, to the overall evidentiary picture.
A review of the principle of corroboration demonstrates that every individual piece of evidence does not need to be independently conclusive as to every issue. While a court forms its conviction by evaluating the evidence holistically—a well-established principle—corroboration fundamentally presupposes that evidence possesses inherent relevance to the ultimate conclusion drawn. If all the evidence merely establishes that financial transactions were complex, aggregating those facts may reinforce complexity, but it cannot generate proof regarding the illicit source of funds if none of the underlying facts bears directly on that source. Hence, the analysis of circumstantial evidence is more precise when conducted in three stages: First, determine whether the underlying fact has been established; Second, identify the fact that is sought to be inferred from it; and Third, examine the logical link between the two. However, inference often fails when addressing the third point.
This distinction is especially critical in the context of digital evidence. While blockchain analysis can establish the movement of an asset between wallet addresses with technical precision, it cannot, standing alone, prove the identity of the individual who controlled the relevant private key at the moment of the transaction. Establishing a connection between a wallet and the accused necessitates independent corroboration—such as exchange records, IP logs, or communication evidence. The central evidentiary challenge, therefore, is not the reliability of the underlying blockchain data, but the logical link between that data and the criminal attribution sought to be imposed on the accused.
Large case files require additional caution. A case may contain a bank report, followed by an analysis conducted by the FIU, a police report, and an expert report. These may appear to constitute four separate sources of evidence. However, if the disputed information in all four reports originates from the same initial source without independent verification, this amounts to repetition of the same information rather than genuine corroboration by multiple sources. Consequently, a large volume of documents may explain the movement of funds in considerable detail, but it cannot compensate for the absence of evidence concerning their source or the accused person’s knowledge if those issues remain based on the same assumption.
From the defence perspective, it is not sufficient to argue that each item of circumstantial evidence is weak when considered individually, particularly since the court is right to assess the evidence as a whole. A stronger approach, however, is to demonstrate the limits of the certainty that can reasonably be derived from the body of circumstantial evidence as a whole. If, even after the evidence is considered corroboratively, it establishes only that the transaction was suspicious without addressing the accused person’s knowledge. The problem is not that the evidence has been fragmented, but the conclusion sought exceeds what the evidence actually demonstrates. Although the corroboration of evidence may strengthen an inference, it cannot create a missing element of the attribution of the offence to the accused.
Individual attribution in multi-defendant money laundering cases
Where a case involves multiple co-defendants, prosecution pleadings frequently describe the charged conduct collectively—for example, asserting that ‘the accused individuals received the funds, the accused individuals transferred them, and knew their illicit origin.’ While such generalized phrasing simplifies narrative presentation, it improperly obscures critical distinctions regarding each individual’s specific role, conduct, and degree of knowledge.
A single case file may involve a company owner, a finance manager, an employee who executes transfers, a gold trader, and a person who controls a digital wallet. Establishing the existence of a common scheme does not mean that the evidence concerning each participant’s role is identical.
Article 2 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 itself frames the rule by reference to a specific individual: a person who knows, or in respect of whom sufficient evidence or circumstantial indications establish knowledge, and who then intentionally commits one of the specified acts. Knowledge is personal, and conduct is personal, even when the crime is committed through cooperation or a division of roles.
Of course, criminal liability does not require each participant to personally execute every phase of the laundering scheme. Liability may arise through participation in accordance with the applicable provisions. However, participation itself requires conduct attributable to the individual concerned and a corresponding mental state, including the requisite intent, consistent with the applicable legal classification.
A common practical example involves a company account through which several individuals conduct different transactions. A person’s position as a director or authorised signatory does not necessarily mean that he initiated every transfer or knew the origin of every sum. Conversely, correspondence or system permissions may reveal that a person who holds no formal position in the company’s records was, in fact, directing the transactions.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between formal corporate status, signing authority, and actual authority to direct or dispose of the funds—that is, effective control—and then determine whether the requisite knowledge of the purpose of the conduct existed.
The same principle applies to a chain of transactions involving cash, gold, and virtual assets. The person who collects the cash may have full knowledge of its origin, while the gold trader receives the money in the context of what appears to be an ordinary commercial transaction. A third person may then transfer the proceeds of the sale to a digital wallet. The first person’s knowledge cannot automatically be imputed to the second or third merely because all three participated in the same chain of transactions.
For the circumstances to establish knowledge and criminal intent in respect of each individual, there must be information or conduct specifically attributable to that person, such as a prior agreement, communications, instructions, false statements, or a pattern of conduct revealing their knowing participation in the scheme.
Furthermore, corporate title or professional status cannot serve as a substitute for concrete proof. A board chairperson cannot be presumed to possess knowledge of every transaction merely by virtue of their position. Similarly, a compliance officer does not become a co-conspirator simply because a suspicious transaction traversed the institution’s systems. Nor can a beneficial owner be assumed to know the precise origin of every asset entering the corporate entity. A person’s position may be relevant because it determines their authority and access to information. However, it does not justify relying on a general allegation that the individual “knew by virtue of their position” without specifying what information was available to them, when it reached them, and what it revealed.
Therefore, adjudicating a multi-defendant prosecution requires evaluating each defendant on an individual basis. Liability depends on proving specific facts against each accused: their exact conduct, the particular funds connected to them, their level of control, and evidence proving when and if they possessed criminal knowledge. The existence of a common criminal scheme does not mean that attribution is identical for all participants, just as the corroboration of evidence does not mean collective liability.
Attribution of money laundering liability to legal persons: Distinguishing criminal offenses from regulatory non-compliance
Because a legal entity acts exclusively through natural persons, the mere transmission of funds through a company’s bank account or the unauthorized use of its resources by an employee is insufficient to automatically attribute criminal liability to the corporate entity itself. The defence analysis therefore proceeds in two stages. First, the human conduct involved must be identified. Second, the basis on which that conduct may be regarded as having been committed in the name of or for the account of the legal person must be established.
Article 4 of Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025 provides for the liability of a legal person where one of the offences prescribed by the law is intentionally committed in its name or for its account, without prejudice to the personal liability of the individual who committed the offence or to the applicable administrative penalties. By reviewing the provision itself, we can see distinct forms of liability that may coexist or arise separately: the liability of the individual who committed the act, the liability of the company, and regulatory liability arising from regulatory non-compliance.
Consequently, the statement that “the offence occurred within the company” is insufficient, by itself, to attribute the conduct to the company. An employee may have misused the company’s account for personal gain unrelated to the company’s interests, or a manager may have exceeded their authority to pursue a personal scheme. Also, the company’s management may have incorporated criminal activity into its business operations or made it a source of corporate profit.
The facts determine the nature of liability at issue. It is necessary to examine who issued the instructions, who benefited, whether corporate accounts and assets were utilized as instruments of the scheme, and whether the alleged conduct was executed for the account of the legal person or to its detriment.
The distinction between criminal liability and regulatory non-compliance is particularly important for financial institutions, Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), and virtual asset service providers. The law imposes obligations concerning risk assessment, customer due diligence, ongoing monitoring, internal policies, and record-keeping, and provides for administrative penalties where these obligations are breached. This regulatory regime would lose its independent legal character if every procedural deficiency in KYC or transaction monitoring were automatically conflated with criminal money laundering.
A regulatory breach may be serious and serve as critical evidence in a criminal case if the evidence shows it was not merely negligent, but intentionally committed to facilitate the offence. For example, an institution’s failure to update a customer’s information on time does not establish that it knew the source of the customer’s funds. The position changes, however, if internal communications show that responsible officials received specific information about the criminal origin of the funds and then deliberately disabled alerts or altered the customer’s risk classification so that profitable transactions could continue.
In those circumstances, key factors such as knowledge, intent, and corporate benefit gain relevance. These factors can support holding the corporation liable for actions taken by its representatives on its behalf, as opposed to personal actions conducted outside the scope of corporate management.
Accordingly, the criminal liability of a legal person cannot be inferred solely from ownership of the account or deficiencies in its compliance system. It is necessary to establish the link that transforms the conduct of a natural person into conduct attributable to the legal person under the applicable statutory conditions. The principle of attribution is clear: a crime occurring within a company’s operations is not enough on its own to establish corporate liability, unless it is proven that the offence was committed in the company’s name or on its behalf.
Constructing an attribution-based defence in money laundering proceedings
A money laundering case file can be misleading because of its sheer volume. It may contain hundreds of pages, dozens of accounts, and extensive tables of transfers, all of which may lead the defence to approach the case as a chronological narrative beginning with the first document and ending with the last.
Although this approach may help in understanding the facts, it is not always the most effective way to construct the defence. A more useful approach is to reorganise the file according to the elements of attribution.
The analysis should begin by identifying the funds subject to accusation, establishing their source, and determining who controlled them. It should then identify the conduct attributed to the accused, distinguish between what they knew at the time of the acts and what they discovered after the transactions were completed, and assess the purpose that the evidence establishes.
The starting point should be the money or proceeds themselves. The specific amount or asset identified by the Public Prosecution as proceeds should be determined, rather than merely reviewing every amount that entered and left the account.
For example, in a fraud case, the defence must trace the location of the proceeds, pinpoint when they left the victim’s control, and identify where they first re-emerged following the predicate offence. In a bribery case, the analysis must begin by identifying the specific funds or benefit that formed the subject of the bribe. This targeted approach prevents legitimate funds from being commingled with those subject to charge, particularly in commercial accounts that combine genuine business transactions with suspicious activity.
The next step is to distinguish the physical movement of funds from actual control over them. While tracing a transaction can establish that funds moved from one account to another, it does not prove who ordered the transfer. For corporate accounts, this requires examining signature cards, system permissions, access logs, and internal communications. For virtual assets, the focus must shift beyond the wallet address to who exercised actual control over the account or private keys. The goal is not simply to show where the money flowed, but to prove who directed its movement and whether they acted with the required knowledge and intent.
The defence should then identify the specific form of conduct attributed to the accused. There is little value in discussing money laundering as a general concept when the referral order speaks about the transfer of proceeds with the intent to conceal their origin, possession of the proceeds, concealment of their true nature, or assistance to the perpetrator of the predicate offence. Each form of conduct has its own factual and mental elements. A defence appropriate to a transfer intended to conceal the source of funds may not be equally appropriate to a charge involving possession or use of the proceeds.
The timing of knowledge also deserves separate examination within the case file. Documents should be arranged according to the information available to the accused at the time of each transaction.
This approach also assists in preparing the defence memorandum. The defence is not required to reproduce everything that occurred during the investigation before the court. Instead, the memorandum should begin with the element or requirement that has not been adequately established, thereby identifying the weakness or defect in attribution. Examples include the failure to establish the source of the funds, the failure to attribute control over a transaction to the accused, the inference of knowledge from indicators that establish no more than suspicion, or the failure to demonstrate the requisite intent.
Supporting the legal and factual arguments with documentary evidence also strengthens the defence’s position by requiring the court to address and assess the substance of those arguments, rather than dismissing them as unsupported assertions or merely factual arguments that require no specific response.
Published UAE money laundering precedents confirm that trial courts enjoy broad discretion in evaluating evidence. However, this discretion remains bounded by the requirement that judicial inferences be logical and grounded in the record. This distinction is critical given that most published decisions were rendered under Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018, whereas the current governing framework is Federal Decree-Law No. 10 of 2025. While earlier case law remains valuable, for examining issues of fund origins, judicial reasoning, evidentiary soundness, and the autonomy of the money laundering offence. Practitioners must exercise caution when relying on earlier judicial decisions to interpret provisions introduced by a new law, particularly where those provisions were non-existent or phrased differently before those courts in their current form.
The established judicial decisions illustrate the approach taken by the courts to attribution in this offence. The courts do not require direct evidence of every element and accept inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. However, they require the conclusions to be reasonable and grounded in the evidence on record, and they require the judgment to address substantive defence arguments that concern an essential element of the offence.
Under the current legislation, the most sensitive issue is the scope of the phrase “sufficient evidence or circumstantial indications of knowledge.” Based on the officially published judgments available, there does not yet appear to be a settled final judicial interpretation specifically addressing this newly introduced wording. Caution must be exercised against expanding the interpretation and application of these provisions. This restraint is vital to safeguard the distinct character of criminal law—which demands strict clarity regarding the material and moral elements of an offence—and to honor the specific nature of the philosophy of criminal conviction, where conviction requires judicial certainty rather than mere suspicion.
In conclusion, attribution is the focal point where all evidentiary aspects of money laundering converge. The central issue is not simply whether an unusual transaction occurred, or whether funds moved across accounts or were converted into gold or virtual assets. While such facts may be accurate and relevant, they cannot sustain criminal liability unless integrated into an evidentiary framework that traces the funds from their illicit origin, through the prohibited conduct, directly to the accused and their requisite mental state.
The independence of money laundering from the predicate offence does not alter this framework. While the law does not require a prior conviction for the predicate offence or precise identification of its exact legal classification, it does not presume that funds are of illicit origin merely because their source is unclear. Circumstantial or direct evidence must establish that the proceeds derive from unlawful activity, alongside evidence—which may overlap with the former—demonstrating the accused’s conduct and requisite knowledge.
Accordingly, while the complex nature of money laundering justifies considerable investigative flexibility, it does not permit bypassing the fundamental requirements of criminal attribution. The more intricate the transaction, the greater the need to establish a direct link from the evidence to the accused, rather than working backward from suspicion.
In this sense, criminal attribution is the safeguard that allows money laundering to be combated effectively without permitting indicators of suspicion, no matter how numerous, to become a substitute for proof of criminal liability.
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Abdulmajeed Ahmed Alsweedy Senior Counsel [email protected] |
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Fatema Obeid Almheiri Advocate [email protected] |


